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In this paper, we consider the optimal decisions of altruistic individuals on consumption, 
annuity savings, non-annuity, bequests and health investment when they are given any 
contract.  We also examine the annuity return and quantity offered by firms in the 
presence of full-information and private information. We start from a simple case with 
exogenous survival rates, and then extend the model to the cases where survival rates are 
endogenous due to individuals’ health investment. Four cases are further studied with 
endogenous survival rates—full-information, moral hazard, adverse selection and a 
mixture of moral hazard and adverse selection. We find that in a full-information case 
(the first best case), the amount of intentional bequests is equal to the accidental bequests. 
In a pure moral hazard case, the individuals’ consumption path is strictly distorted; while 
in a pure adverse selection case, only those with low survival rates have their 
consumption paths distorted due to the externality of those with high survival rates. In the 
presence of both problems, the decisions of people with high survival rates are distorted 
the same way as in a pure moral hazard case while the decisions of people with low 
survival rates are further distorted due to the externality generated by those with high 







In an influential paper, Yaari (1965) has shown that in the absence of bequest motives, 
individuals would fully annuitize savings to earn annuity returns that are higher than the 
market interest rates. Whereas in the presence of bequest motives, the uncertain lifetime 
would lead individuals to choose a “portfolio mix” not only to optimize consumption but 
to optimize savings and annuity purchases. However, bequest motives of annuity 
purchasers appear to have been rarely considered by the literature studying contract 
design of annuity firms. The individuals in our model are altruistic, who would value the 
bequest, both intentionally and accidentally left to their offspring.  
         In the paper, we distinguish the concepts of the “intentional bequests”---left to the 
offspring if the person survives to the second period,  and the “accidental bequests” ---left 
to the offspring if the person cannot survive to the second period. This distinction fully 
captures the notion of “altruistic individuals”, who care the child’s wealth in both 
situations. While most literature focus only on one of the above scenarios, our paper 
examines this complication and its impacts on the consumer’s optimal decision and the 
firm’s profit maximization behaviors. 
         An important issue for a non-altruistic individual is how to allocate consumption, 
regular savings earning the market interest rate, bequests, and annuity purchases which 
would generate higher return than the market interest rate. If a contract provided is a 
combination of annuity quantity and return, the consumer would maximize his utility by 
choosing an optimal level of regular savings and bequests.  At the same time, annuity 
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firms would design contracts that are attractive enough for consumers and would earn 
non-negative profit.  
         However, the availability of information plays a key role in annuity firms’ contract 
design. We would focus on the discrepancy of firms’ contracts and individuals’ decisions 
when individuals are given any contract.  In the case of full information, when decisions 
of individuals can be observed, annuity firms would offer a utility-maximizing actuarially 
fair contract, which would be equivalent to consumers’ utility maximization problem if 
they are given any contract. And the competitive equilibrium under full information is 
Pareto optimal. However, when individuals possess private information, such as a moral 
hazard and/or an adverse selection problem, the potential inefficiencies and/or negative 
externalities would be highlighted. Since individuals’ decisions are not observable, and to 
overcome this information asymmetry, firms would design contracts that exclude the 
possibility of earning negative profit due to consumers’ private information.  
        We examine the cases of full information, a pure moral hazard problem, a pure 
adverse selection problem and a mixture of moral hazard and adverse selection problem, 
and find a particular solution to each of these cases.  We use a simplest case where the 
initial survival rate is exogenous to contrast with a full information case where health 
investment taken by individuals can be observed by annuity firms, and we find these two 
cases share several similar properties. In cases where private information presents, we use 
the first order condition constraint approach, proposed by Davies and Kuhn 1992, to deal 
with a moral hazard problem; and an incentive compatibility constraint is used to analyze 
an adverse selection problem.  
9 
 
        We explore the role of bequests and regular (i.e. non-annuity) savings in consumers’ 
utility maximization and in firms’ contract design. We find that when annuity firms have 
full information on consumers, the consumer would leave the same amount of intentional 
and accidental bequests (regular savings). When there is private information, since 
consumer decisions on bequests and regular savings would not affect annuity firms’ 
profit, the optimal conditions on savings and bequests are the same for the contract 
design.  
         We also investigate the role of health investment in consumers’ utility 
maximization and firms’ contract design. We show that there is a discrepancy between 
individuals’ choice on health investment when given any contract and contractible health 
investment which guarantees non-negative profit of the firm. In the full-information case, 
consumers would take actions to affect their health state just as their annuity contracts 
settle. However, in the presence of private information, the utility would be lowered, and 
probably, health care would be overinvested,  due to the implementation of policies 
aimed to overcome this information asymmetry.  
       Our contribution is to incorporate both “accidental bequests” and “intentional 
bequests”, which fully captures the characteristics of the altruistic individuals. We 
characterize solutions of intertemporal consumption-saving decisions, bequests, health 
investment, and annuity purchases based on the availability of information. We differ 
from those in the literature in that we consider both consumers’ optimal allocations given 
any contract and firms’ behaviors when designing non-negative profit contracts. We fully 
discuss consumers’ decisions and firms’ contracts in four cases—full-information, a 
moral hazard problem, an adverse selection problem and a mixed situation with both 
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moral hazard and adverse selection problems, while most of previous studies focus only 
on one or two aspects without taking planned and accidental bequests into consideration 
at the same time. We will argue that both types of bequests are important in the 
determination of not only total saving but also the division between annuity and non-
annuity savings. We also discuss some special cases where bequest motivation is absent 
or survival rates are exogenous to gain a closer look into the role of information on 
welfare.  
       The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews previous literature. 
Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 presents a simplest case without health 
investment. Section 5 discusses health investment, information and contracts. Section 6 












2. Literature Review 
Yaari (1965) has established the fundamental theory of the consumer with uncertain 
lifetime. His paper discussed the role of the Fisher-type utility function— the normal 
form of expected utility representation and the Marshall utility function— the penalty 
function with direct preference on bequests. The Marshall utility function approach 
provides a rationale for including bequest motivation in the lifetime utility.  
 Based on the availability of the annuity, therefore, four cases have been discussed 
on the consumer’s consumption-saving decision under uncertainty. Case A investigates 
the situation where the Fisher utility function is maximized subject to a wealth constraint 
when the insurance is unavailable. In this case, the consumer tends to discount the future 
more heavily. Case B considers the case where the Marshall utility function is maximized 
when the insurance is unavailable. The result shows that the consumer becomes more 
impatient if the marginal utility of consumption is greater than the marginal utility of 
bequests. Case C maximizes the Fisher utility function subject to the wealth constraint 
when the annuity is available. In this case, the consumer’s assets (or liabilities) will 
always be held in the form of annuities due to a higher rate of return in annuity markets. 
Case D is actually a portfolio problem, since the altruistic consumer needs to optimize his 
purchase of annuities and the amount of savings that will be left for the offspring. The 
optimal saving plan and the optimal consumption plan are symmetric, which means when 




 The contribution of his paper is that it provides useful techniques—the chance-
constrained programming, or the Fisher-utility function procedure and the penalty 
function, or the Marshall utility function procedure—for the analysis of uncertain lifetime 
of the consumer. It also provides the rationale for including bequests into the utility 
function, and derives the optimal consumption-saving plans when the insurance is or is 
not available. However, it does not consider consumers’ decisions to change their 
survival chances.  
 Davies and Kuhn (1992) have proposed a simple model of annuities and social 
security when the hidden actions taken by the consumer could affect his longevity.  Their 
paper has the following main results. First, in a pure moral hazard society, the mandatory 
actuarially fair social security system will never enhance the welfare due to the inability 
to “undo” the excessive public annuities and the fact that any increase in the level of the 
annuity from its optimal level will strictly reduce welfare. Second, a mandatory social 
security system with a moral hazard problem would have an ambiguous effect on 
longevity, rather than a usually expected positive effect. Third, in second-best annuity 
markets, social welfare can always be improved by a marginal longevity-reducing change 
in health behavior with actuarially fair annuities. Their paper analyzes the problem of 
competitive annuity firms, providing an insight for annuity firms’ establishing contracts 
in a pure moral hazard economy. In doing so, it contrasts the optimal decisions of annuity 
purchasing and the welfare results under first best (full-information) context and second-
best (private information) case, and examines the role of a mandatory social security 
system on welfare and longevity. One of the most important contributions of their paper 
is that it proposes a useful technique to deal with the contract in a moral hazard 
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economy—the First Order Condition constraint, meaning that the competitive firms 
offering utility-maximizing actuarially -fair contracts should be subject to the constraint 
that the consumers will choose privately-optimal level of savings and health investment 
in response to any given contract. 
 However, their paper leaves several questions unanswered. First, indentifying 
three types of health-related goods, their paper assumes that the consumption of health-
related goods directly affect the consumer’s utility. The lack of consensus about the 
literature in the role of health expenditure also suggests that health care can be only 
considered as investment—affecting consumers' survival without inducing direct utility. 
Second, according to Yaari (1965), individuals with no bequest motivation would keep 
all the positive net assets in the form of annuities because annuities generate higher return 
than the market interest rate. In Davies and Kuhn’s paper, regular savings is optimally 
chosen by the non-altruistic individual and can be positive. Third, as admitted by the 
authors, a complete analysis of social security system requires the consideration of both 
moral hazard and adverse selection problem.  
             Eckstein et al. (1985) described an economy with a pure adverse selection 
problem, where two groups of individuals keep their specific survival probability as 
private information when purchasing annuities from the markets. The presence of high 
survival rate individuals imposes a negative externality on other agents. In the case where 
the Rothschild-Stigliz equilibrium exists, such an externality is purely destructive in the 
sense that people with low survival rates are worse off than under a full-information 
context while those with high survival rates are not better off. In the case where the 
Wilson equilibrium exists, people with low survival rates are still worse off while people 
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with high survival rates are better off. A mandatory social security program can always 
be welfare- enhancing in a pure adverse selection environment. Their work examines the 
conditions for a competitive equilibrium to exist in an adverse selection economy and the 
criteria to evaluate the desirability of government intervention. It also provides the 
economic intuition for an incentive constraint in annuity contracts. However, it is also 
possible that the survival rate is endogenous, rather than exogenously given when adverse 
selection is a problem. 
 Eichenbaum and Peled (1987) have investigated the existence of involuntary 
bequests when agents have no bequest motivation living in a pure adverse selection 
economy and agents’ specific survival rates are private information. Their work is 
considered as an extension of Eckstein et al. (1985), in which no storable good is 
analyzed. They have established the results that the equilibrium in which the involuntary 
bequests are held by private agents cannot be Pareto optimal. A mandatory actuarially 
fair annuity program can result in the equilibrium without involuntary bequests that 
Pareto-dominates the initial equilibrium. Their paper contributes to the literature by 
showing that the involuntary bequests appear in equilibrium with private information 
even though agents have no bequest motivation. The inefficiency of the competitive 
equilibrium with involuntary bequests due to private information naturally induces the 
Pareto-improvement role of a mandatory social annuity plan. In line with Eckstein et al. 
(1985), they also show that a mandatory social annuity plan can be welfare-improving.  
However, a complete analysis of annuity markets still, requires consideration of both 
moral hazard and adverse selection problem, and endogenous survival depends on 
individuals’ hidden actions. 
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 Pauly (1974) has shown that in the presence of private information—moral hazard 
and adverse selection—the competitive outcome in insurance markets is non-optimal. It 
is proposed that public intervention may produce Pareto optimal improvements.  His 
work underlines the analysis of both moral hazard and adverse selection problem in 
insurance markets, contributing to the literature of annuity markets. Actually, the 
techniques he used to analyze insurance companies can also be applied to the problem of 
annuity firms.  
 Platoni (2008) has established a particular model with annuity markets 
characterized by both moral hazard and adverse selection problems. The moral hazard 
problem arises as individuals choose the optimal level of health investment in responding 
to any given contract; while an adverse selection problem arises due to the heterogeneity 
in preference.  In a pure moral hazard economy of his model, individuals with different 
types of preferences are worse off than in the full-information case in the sense that the 
Euler equations of both types of people are strictly distorted upwards and individuals tend 
to overinvestment in health care. In a pure adverse selection economy, the decisions of 
consumers with a stronger taste for old-age consumption and a greater joy of giving 
bequests are undistorted. By contrast, the decisions of consumers with a weaker taste for 
old-age consumption and a smaller joy of giving bequests are distorted  in a way that they 
consume more in the first period and consume less in the second period. In the presence 
of both problems, a separating equilibrium is characterized by the fact that the welfare of 
more patient consumers is affected in the same way as in a pure moral hazard case while 
the welfare of less patient consumers is further distorted—a distortion coming from both 
moral hazard and adverse selection. In a pooling equilibrium, more patient consumers are 
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better off than in a full-information case, while less patient consumers are worse off than 
in a full-information case.  
 The contributions of Platoni (2008) are as follows. First, it analyzes the cases of a 
pure moral hazard economy, an adverse selection problem, and the mixture of the two 
problems, and presents the main findings in different cases. Second, the paper is distinct 
from the previous literature in the way of inducing heterogeneity. In the previous studies 
of the annuity market, the heterogeneity across individuals is reflected in any given 
survival rates. In his paper, by endogenizing health investment in survival rate and the 
fact that time preferences affect health investment, the heterogeneity is derived from the 
difference in preference. This method is convenient to study a model with both moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems where individuals can choose an optimal level of 
health investment and have different types of survival rates.  Third, it provides policy 
implications based on the result that government intervention may yield Pareto 
improvements under a separating equilibrium while the intervention may improve the 
well-being of individuals affected by the inefficiencies and negative externalities under a 
pooling equilibrium. However, it does not consider a case where the optimal level of 
annuities and non-annuity savings are both positive. In the real world, whether driven by 
precaution or joy of giving bequests, individuals tend to have a fraction of their total 
savings to be more liquid than annuity assets such as non-annuity savings as in most 
developed countries.   
           Zhang & Tang (2008) have explored the role of uninsurable medical expenses on 
the optimal decisions of annuitized savings and unannuitized savings. It also provides the 
interesting policy implications for government subsidies in preventative and remedial 
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medical expenses for enhancing longevity. Their main findings are as followings. First, at 
a relatively lower initial survival rate, the consumer tends to fully annuitize his savings 
regardless of medical expenses, while at a relatively higher initial survival rate the 
consumer tends to have a positive non-annuitized savings, which increases as a further 
rise of the survival rate. Second, the paper illustrates the uniqueness of the solution for 
any given mortality and morbidity rates, which naturally induce the importance of 
comparative static analyses to see how the annuitized savings respond to the exogenous 
variables. Third, at a relatively high survival rate and a relatively low price of preventive 
health investment, the optimal level of preventive health care is positive, and government 
subsidies on remedial medical expenses would discourage preventive health investment.  
 One contribution of their paper is to provide the rationale for the positive 
unannuitized savings—the precautionary savings. The individuals in the model have an 
exogenous morbidity rate and they need to keep a fraction of total savings unannuitized 
in the sense that the unannuitized savings are more flexible to deal with the emergency.  
Meanwhile, the uniqueness of the solution contributes to the literature for the clarity in 
the relationship between longevity and annuitization. The third contribution of the paper 
is its policy implications. When the survival rate is high enough and the price of 
preventive health investment is low enough so that the optimal preventive health care is 
positive, the government should balance the subsidies on preventive health care and 
remedial health care since subsidies on preventive health investment may reduce future 
morbidity and remedial expenses.  
 There are several problems failed to be considered by their paper. In most 
developed countries, medical expenses are insurable by either public social security 
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system or private insurance policy, or the mixture of the two. The paper considers only 
uninsurable or out-of-pocket medical expenses and ignores the full or partial insurable 
medical expenses, which may introduce different results from the paper. Another 
problem is when the morbidity rate in the second period depends on the health investment 
in the first period, a moral hazard problem arises if the consumer possesses private 
information. It is possible that, though the optimal health investment is positive, people 
may over-invest in health care, and thus lower the utility or welfare level. Therefore, it is 
necessary to include the analysis of annuity firms’ behaviors under private information.  
 Pecchenino and Pollard (1997) have examined the effects of introducing 
actuarially fair annuity markets into an overlapping generation model of endogenous 
growth. They show that the full annuitization creates the maximized growth with a zero 
social security tax rate, while the full annuitization is not, in general optimal. The degree 
of annuitization that is dynamically optimal depends nonmonotonically on the expected 
length of retirement and the pay-as-you-go social security tax rate. Their work shed light 
on further studies of annuity markets in a dynamic context. It also provides policy 
implications for a government sponsored, actuarially fair pension system. However, there 
are limitations in this paper. One of them is the assumption of a percentage restriction on 
voluntary annuitization. This assumption is not a true reflection of real life in the sense 
that most countries do not set restricts on individuals’ purchases of annuities. According 
to Yaari (1965), individuals without bequest motivation must fully annuitize their savings. 
It is expected that under both plans with positive nonannuitized savings, the choices are 
not optimal, and the growth rate is not maximized.  Another problem is the inconsistency 
of assumptions. The paper assumes that if the non-altruistic individual dies when he is 
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young at certain probability, his annuitized wealth is bequeathed to his child. This 
assumption naturally introduces a heterogeneity regarding to the bequest within 
individuals living in the same generation. At generation T,   an individual’s bequest 
should depend on not only his parent but the mortality history of the family (Zhang et 
al.(2003)). But in the analysis of bequest evolution, the authors simply assume that the 
bequests are equally allocated across all members of a generation.  
           Zhang et al. (2003) have analyzed the impact of a rising survival rate on economic 
growth in an overlapping generation model. In their model, the individuals in one 
generation are heterogeneous with respect to the unintentional bequest from the previous 
generations. They show that a decline in mortality can affect economic growth in a 
positive way due to the rise in the saving rate, and however, in a negative way due to the 
reduction in unintentional bequests. Starting from a high mortality rate, the net effect of a 
decline in mortality rate raises the growth rate, while staring from a low mortality rate, 
further reduction in mortality would lower the growth rate. Their work contributes to the 
literature in the following aspects. First, the findings are consistent with empirical 
evidence.  Second, it provides useful techniques to deal with the evolution of accidental 
bequests in an overlapping generation model. Though individuals are heterogeneous 
within one generation, the aggregated savings and bequest can be traced, and thus, the 
capital accumulation can be characterized.   However, since the paper has excluded the 
existence of annuity markets in the economy, it fails to discuss individuals’ behaviors and 
growth when annuity markets are available. And the assumption of non-altruistic 
individuals leaving accidental bequests needs to be further considered.  
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 Our paper extends the existing studies to analyze annuity savings, non-annuity 
savings, health investment and intergenerational transfers motivated by parental joy-of-
giving. We will also divide this intergenerational transfer into planned and accidental 
portions and show both of them are important in the determination of not only the total 
amount of saving but also the division between annuity and non-annuity savings. We will 
introduce the basic features of the model in section 3. We will start in section 4 with a 
simple model whereby consumers have exogenous survival rates to enter old age. The 
model will be extended in section 5 to include health investment which may or may not 
be observable by insurance firms. A further extension will be made in section 5 to have 
different degrees of patience for old-age consumption and different degrees of the joy of 










3. The Model 
In this economy, there is a single non-storable good, an exogenously determined interest 
rate r  and a large number of agents living for a maximum of two periods with a survival 
rate to the second period between 0 and 1. The mass of agents in the first stage of life is 
normalized to unity. Each agent in the first period is endowed with w units of good and 
receives a bequest b  from the last generation. Agents allocate consumption 
intertemporally by purchasing annuities A  in the first period which promises to pay him 
a higher rate of returnα  than the market interest rate r in the second period if the 
purchaser is still alive.  
 Agents are altruistic, motivated by joy of giving bequests. They each leave an 
intentional bequest b′ to the next generation if they are alive in the second period or an 
accidental bequest sr)1( + from their first period non-annuity or regular savings if they 
die before entering the second period. Both forms of bequests are valued in the agent’s 
utility.  This joint consideration of both types of bequests is a new feature compared to 
the literature, to the best of our knowledge. 
            The representative agent’s expected utility is given by 
           ])1[()1()()()( 21 srubuCuCuU +−+′++= πφφπβπ                                              (1)  
where )1,0(∈π is the survival rate, 0)( >⋅′u , 0)( <⋅′′u , ∞→′ )(xu as 0→x and 
0)( →′ xu as ∞→x . )1,0(, ∈φβ are the discount factors and the assumption βφ <  
indicates agents value more of their own consumption in the second period than bequests 
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left for the next generation. Our analysis will proceed from simple to more complex cases 
















4. The Simplest Case: An Exogenous Survival Rate 
In this case, agents live through to the end of the second period with an exogenous 
survival rate of )1,0(∈p . In the annuity market, “the actuarial fairness condition” holds 
for market clearing; that is, the expected value of interest payments on the annuity is 
equal to the market interest rate.  
          rp +=+ 1)1( α                                           (2) 
 For analytical tractability, we adopt a popularly used logarithmic utility function.  
The representative agent’s program is given by 
         ])1ln[()1(lnlnln 21,, srpbpCpCUMax bsA +−+′++=′ φφβ  
                   s.t.       sAbwC −−+=1  
                              bsrAC ′−+++= )1()1(2 α  
With market clearing condition (2), we have the following first order conditions, which 
define a competitive equilibrium with an exogenous survival rate.  






+= β                                                              (3) 
         )(s           
1 2
1 (1 ) (1 )p r p
C C s
β φ+ −= +                          (4) 
         )(b′          bC ′=
φβ
2
                                                     (5) 
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Equation (3) is the optimal condition on annuity purchase, which can be interpreted as the 
Euler equation for consumption in both periods. Equation (4) is the optimal condition on 
non-annuity savings, including a new component in the marginal benefit of non-annuity 
saving derived from accidental bequests compared to the literature. Equation (5) is the 
optimal condition governing planned bequests. 
  
Proposition 1: With an exogenous survival rate, the representative agent allocates a 
constant ratio of annuity purchases to total savings, which is increasing in the survival 
rate ,and decreasing in the bequest motivation. 
Proof.  Equation (5) and the budget constraint of 2C imply 




β                                                     (6) 
Equations (6) and (3) give 
         
s
p
AC +=+ 1)( φβ                                                                         (7) 
Equations (3) and (4) imply 
          φ
sC =1                                                                         (8) 
Equations (7) and (8) give 




                                                      
                                                        (9) 
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If we consider the total savings as sA + , then define
sA
A
+=γ as the proportion of 
annuity purchases to total savings, 
       φβ
βγ += p
p                  (10) 
Equation (10) states that each agent allocates γ  of his total savings to annuity purchase 
and )1( γ−  to accidental bequests to a future generation. As p or (and) β increases, the 
ratio of annuity purchases to total savings increases, and as φ increases this ratio 
decreases. Q.E.D. 
         The intuition behind is that people are willing to spend more of their savings on 
annuity purchases as they expect to live longer or (and) have weaker bequest motives. In 
an extreme case where 0=φ ,we have 1=γ ; that is, the representative agent allocates all 
the savings to annuity purchases. This coincides with Yaari (1965) that the consumer 
with no bequest motive will always hold his assets in annuity form rather than regular 
savings.  
          As in the literature, savings, annuities and young-age consumption are proportional 
to the total income in our model, which can be seen from equations (8), (9) and the 
budget constraint of 1C , 






                                
                     (11)    





β                                         (12) 
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C +++= φβ                          
                     (13) 
          However, it is interesting to obtain a new relationship between the amounts of 
planned and accidental bequests: 
 
Proposition 2:  The amounts of planned and accidental bequests are equal. 
Proof.  From equation (5), we have
 
 
         β
φ 2Cb =′                                                                                                                (14) 
Equations (3), (8) and (14) give 
        srb )1( +=′ .   Q.E.D.                                                             
 The result in Proposition 2 is new compared to the literature and can be very 
helpful for the understanding of intergenerational transfers when allowing for a realistic 
annuity market. According to Kotlikoff and Summers (1981), bequests account for nearly 
half of capital accumulation in the United States. However, there is no joint consideration 
about both planned and accidental bequests despite little doubt in the literature about their 
co-existence in the real world. For example, some studies assume away bequests 
altogether and tread the saving of savors who die before entering old age as waste; see, 
e.g. Ehrlich and Lui (1991). Some studies ignore accidental bequests and assume that 
annuity saving is the only form of saving, implying that bequests are independent of one's 
family mortality history; see, e.g., Zhang et al. (2001). Some studies pay attention to non-
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annuity saving, such as precautionary saving, and assume away annuity markets entirely, 
leading to the dependence of bequests on one's family mortality history; see Abel (1985), 
Huggett (1996) and Zhang et al. (2003). Our results in Proposition 2 reconcile these 
different approaches and provide a useful and simple way to track down the wealth 
distribution over different generations. In our model, as bequests are the same whether 
one survives to the end of lifetime, the total amount of bequests one receives is 













5. Health Investment, Information and Annuity Contracts  
In this section, we modify the simplest case by adding two assumptions. First, we assume 
that the survival rate can be improved through health investment. Agents survive to the 
second period with probability ),1,0()( ∈hπ where h  represents the investment on health 
care. [0, ]h h∈ , where bwh += .  We specify the function π  as  
          he
ah −=1)(π  ,   10 << a                                                                                      (15)          
ππ → as hh → and ππ → as 0→h . 
he
a−=1π  is the upper bound of survival rate by 
investing all the income in health care,  a−=1π is the natural survival rate with no 
health investment, 0 ( ) 1hπ π π< ≤ ≤ < . 
         0)( >=′ −haehπ , 0)( <−=′′ −haehπ . 
        Second, different from the simplest case where we implicitly assume consumers can 
choose the quantity of annuity purchases A, here we assume each contract provided by 
annuity firms is a combination of quantity and return on annuities1, a contract ),( αA . 




1 Rothchild and Stigliz argued that price competition is a special case of price-quantity competition. Most 
literature on annuity firms’ behavior assumes the contract offered by firms is a quantity-return combination. 
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5.1. The Consumer’s Problem 
Given a contract ),( αA , the consumer maximizes utility by allocating consumption plan 
and making decisions on savings, bequests and health investment ),,( hbs ′ .   
 The problem of a representative agent with health investment is given by 
            , , 1 2ln ( ) ln ( ) ln [1 ( )]ln[(1 ) ]s b hMax U C h C h b h r sβπ φπ φ π′ ′= + + + − +  
                   s.t.       hsAbwC −−−+=1  
                               bsrAC ′−+++= )1()1(2 α  
The first order conditions are 
       )(s         
1 2
1 ( )(1 ) [1 ( )]h r h
C C s
βπ π φ+ −= +                                 (16) 
       )(b′        bC ′=
φβ
2
                                                                     (17) 






+′−′′+′= φπφπβπ                            (18) 
Equations (16)-(18) give the consumer’s optimal decisions of savings, bequests and 
health investment when given any annuity contract. Equation (16) is the optimal 
condition on non-annuity savings, which is similar to equation (4). Equation (17) is the 
optimal condition governing planned bequests similar to equation (5). Equation (18) is 
new, presenting the optimal decision on health investment. It can be seen from equations 
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(16)-(18), the optimal decisions on savings, planned bequests and health investment can 
be expressed by ),( αA . From equation (17) and budget constraints, we have 
      
])1()1[(2 srAC ++++= αφβ
β
                                   
          (19) 
                 ])1()1[( srAb ++++=′ αφβ
φ                                                                        (20) 
The relation between h and ),( αA  are implicitly given by (18).
 
 The remaining analyses 
of the problems of firms differ among cases with or without private information on 
consumers' health investment. 
 
5.2. The Firm’s Problem 
 
Generally, perfect competitive annuity firms maximize profit by designing the contract 
with both annuity quantity A and annuity return α, and take consumers’ behavior into 
account. However, from the consumer’s problem, we know that given any contract 
),( αA  , the consumers would accordingly choose ),,( hbs ′  to maximize the utility. 
Among all the contracts, the consumer would only purchase the contract that generates 
the maximum utility; that is, the contract ),( αA  offered by the firm has to maximize 
consumer’s indirect utility ( , )U A α , i.e., 
,, arg ( ( , ), ( , ), ( , ))AA Max U s A b A h Aαα α α α′∈  
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       Therefore, we can actually transform the firm’s problem into another one, rather than 
the usually-adopted profit maximization problem. The firm knows that the consumer 
would only purchase the contract that gives her the maximum indirect utility, and this 
contract has to earn non-negative profit from the firm’s concern. Thus, the general form 
of the firm’s problem in our paper is defined by  
          , ( , )AMax U Aα α  
         . .s t      1 (1 ) ( ) 0r hα π+ − + ≥  
The inequality constraint guarantees that each indirect-utility-maximizing contract earns 
non-negative profit. This transformation is commonly used in the literature about annuity 
firms’ behavior.2 
 
5.2.1 Full-information Private Annuities  
Annuity firms care about the individual decision on health investment which would affect 
the firms’ profit via the non-negative-profit constraint, but firms do not care other 
decisions made by individuals, such as savings and bequests simply because these 
variables do not affect the firm’s profit. With full information, the annuity firm can 
observe health investment taken by individuals, and health investment is contractible. 
Since the firm knows that individuals would take actions to improve health and thus 
affect annuity returns, and these actions and improvement in health may generate 
                                                            
2 E.g. Pauly 1974,Eckstein et al 1985, Echienbaum and Peled 1987, Davies and Kuhn 1985,Platoni 
2008,Eichenbaum and Peled 1987. 
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negative profit to the firm, it has to design a contract ),( αA and a level of h  that 
maximize the consumer’s utility and guarantee non-negative profit of the firm.   
               [ ], , ( , ) ln( ) ( ) ln (1 ) (1 )
( ) ln [1 ( )]ln[(1 ) ]
A hMax U A w b A s h h A r s b
h b h r s
α α βπ α
φπ φ π
′= + − − − + + + + − +
′ + − +  
                 s.t.   1 (1 ) ( )r hα π+ ≥ +  
where ,s b′ given by equations (16) and (17). 
        Note that the inequality constraint is non-binding. Thus, we will consider the case 
where the firm earns zero profit; that is, the inequality is substituted with the equality, a 
linear relation between α and ( )hπ . By “the envelope theorem”, the first order conditions 
are 






+= β                                                                                (3a) 










πββπ            (21) 
       The solution to the competitive equilibrium with full-information is given by 
equation (3a) and (21) from the firm’s side , and (16) and (17) from the consumer’s side. 
Under full information we have several similar results as derived from the simplest case. 
(I)     φ
βπ )(h
s
A =  .  
(II)  ( )
1 ( )
s w b h
h
φ
π β φ= + −+ +   
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                  ( ) ( )
1 ( )
hA w b h
h
π β
π β φ= + −+ +   
                  1
1 ( )
1 ( )
C w b h
hπ β φ= + −+ +   
       (III)       srb )1( +=′   
Annuity purchase, consumption and savings are proportional to total income deducted by 
health investment. And the amounts of planned and accidental bequests are equal. These 
results and equation (21) give a “health investment rule” -- health investment can be 
determined by 
                
1 ( ) ln[1 ( ) ] ln[ (1 )( )] 1
( )
h h r w b h
w b h
π β ϕ π β φ βπ β
+ + + + + = + + − −′ + −                          (22) 
 
Proposition 3: Under full-information, individual investment in health is increasing in 
total income, and decreasing in bequest motive, if the total income w+b is large enough; 
that is  






h ,   0<∂
∂
φ
h   
Proof.   
From equation (22), using the implicit function theorem, we have  
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2 2
1 ( ) 2 1 ( ) (1 )( )ln 1
( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( )( )
h h h r w b
w b h w b h w b h h w b h hw b h
π β φ πβ πβ π β φ βπβ π β φ πβ π β φ
⎡ ⎤′ ′ ⎡ ⎤∂ + + + + + +′= + + + + −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥′+ − + − + − + + + − + +∂ + − ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 
            
2
1 2 1 ( ) (1 )( )ln 1
1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( )
h h r w b
w b h h w b h h w b h h
πβ πβ π β φ βπβπ β φ π β φ πβ π β φφ
⎡ ⎤′ ′⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤∂ + + + +′=− + + + + −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥′+ − + + + − + + + − + +∂ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 
Since 0 ,0 1h w b β≤ ≤ + < < , and if  
2
2 1 ( ) (1 )( )ln 1
1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( )
h r w b
w b h h w b h h
π β π β φ β
π β φ π β π β φ
′ ⎡ ⎤+ + + ++ + + >⎢ ⎥′+ − + + + − + +⎣ ⎦  , 
We have






h ,   0<∂
∂
φ
h .  
       Claim  2
2 1 ( ) (1 )( )ln 1
1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( )
h r w b
w b h h w b h h
π β π β φ β
π β φ π β π β φ
′ ⎡ ⎤+ + + ++ + + >⎢ ⎥′+ − + + + − + +⎣ ⎦   when 
w+b is large enough. 





+ +  is bounded and positive; 
2















⎡ ⎤+ +⎢ ⎥+ +⎣ ⎦  becomes large enough such that the LHS>1.      Q.E.D. 
 Proposition 3 is intuitive because as total income increases we can expect health 
investment increases when income reaches a certain level. When the total income is 
relatively small, the opportunity cost of investment in health goes to infinity; individuals 
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would allocate the marginal income to consumption, rather than to investment on health. 
While the motivation of leaving planned bequests decreases, individuals care more about 
themselves, willing to invest more on health care.  
 It is worth noting that equation (18) and (21) are different. Equation (18) is the 
optimal decision of health investment when the consumer is given an annuity 
contract ),( αA . From the consumer’s view, the annuity return )1( α+ is constant, or 
exogenously given, not necessarily subject to “the actuarial fairness condition”.  However, 
with full information, the annuity firm can contract h , which is endogenized in the 
annuity return. Comparing equation (18) and (21), we find an extra term in (21), 
2(1 ) / [ ( ) ]r A h Cβ π π′− + . Along with equations (16a), (17a) and (3a), it can be simplified 
to )( πβ ′− , whose absolute value is the discounted marginal rate of survival  due to an 
increase in one unit of health investment.  
 
5.2.2. Private-information: Moral Hazard 
In this case, we will assume that annuity firms cannot observe health investment taken by 
individuals. Individuals can take hidden actions to improve their longevity and thus 
annuity returns, which is a moral hazard problem. Individuals choose the optimal level of 
h in response to a contract ),( αA offered by annuity firms.  
 We use First Order Approach (see,e.g., Davies and Kuhn 1992) to analyze the 
firm’s problem.  When individuals take hidden actions to invest in health, competitive 
firms offer an indirect-utility-maximizing actuarially fair contract ),( αA , subject to the 
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constraint that individuals choose privately-optimal level of h , which is the first order 
condition given by (18). Firms do not care individual decisions on savings and bequests 
because these variables do not affect the firm’s profit. 
 The problem of annuity firms under moral hazard is  









              s.t.   1 (1 ) ( )r hα π+ ≥ +  
where , ,s b h′  given by equations (16) , (17), and (18). 
       Note that the inequality constraint is non-binding. Similar to the full-information 
case, we can substitute the inequality with the equality constraint. By “the envelope 
theorem”, the first order condition w.r.t. A is 
                              ( )
1 2
1 (1 ) 1r
C C
β η+= −                                                                                                  (23) 
where A h A
A A
π πη π π
′∂ ∂= ⋅ = ⋅∂ ∂  is the survival elasticity of annuity, which measures the rate 




∂  can be derived from equations (16)-(18) by using “the implicit function 
theorem”. From the annuity firm’s point, the largest concern when offering the contract 
in a moral hazard case is how people would affect their own longevity (by investing on 
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health) in respond to any change in annuity quantity. In a moral hazard case,  if 0η = , 








β> + .            
 
Proposition 4: In a pure moral hazard case, a competitive equilibrium is characterized 
by the decisions of  ( , , , , )A s h bα ′ , such that the altruistic individuals maximize utility by 
choosing optimal savings s, health investment h, and intentional bequestsb′ , taking the 
quantity and return of annuities as given; annuity firms offer indirect- utility-maximizing 
contracts (A,α) subject to the non-negative profit condition and the constraint that 
individuals choose privately-optimal health investment when given any contract. The 
solution to , ,A s h are given by the following system of non-linear equations; the solution 
to α and b′ can be explicitly derived from this system. 
            
[ ]1 1
( )




+= −+ − − − +                                                                        (24) 













+=−−−+                                                      (25) 
             
[ ]1 ( ) ln (1 )( ) ln (1 )
( )
Ar s r s
w b A s h h
π ψ π β φ π φπ
⎡ ⎤′ ′ ′= + + + + − +⎢ ⎥+ − − − ⎣ ⎦              (26) 
where , ln lnA h A
A A
π π β φη ψ β φπ π β φ β φ
′ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂ ∂= ⋅ = ⋅ = +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ + +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ . 
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           Equation (24) is the Euler equation under a moral hazard economy, which depends 
on the survival elasticity of annuity quantity. Equation (25) represents the optimal 
decision on regular savings, in the same form as in a full-information case. Equation (26) 
is the optimal health decision with moral hazard. This system of nonlinear equations 
gives a different solution from that in a full-information case, by recognizing the fact that 
the RHS of equation (26) is strictly greater than the RHS  of equation (21)—the optimal 
decision on health investment with full-information. Thus, the solution in full-
information cannot satisfy the above equation system; the optimal decisions on regular 
savings, bequests, and health investment are strictly distorted when moral hazard is 
present! 
           We can also describe the relation between savings and annuities in a moral hazard 
case. Equations (23), (16) and (17) give  
             [ ]




βπ η β φ π
φ φ π
+= − −                                                                                 (27) 
Compared to result (I), an extra term                          appears in equation (27).    
           The relation between intentional and accidental bequests given by equations (23), 
(16), and (17) is  
             






− −′ = + ⋅ −                                                                                   (28) 
[ ]
















− appears in equation (28). Since 1η < , 
we have (1 )b r s′ > + , if 0η < ; (1 )b r s′ < + ,if 0 1 ( )hη π< < − ; (1 )b r s′ = + , if 0η = . 
Since both intentional and accidental bequests cannot be non-positive, it is impossible 
that 1 ( ) 1hπ η− ≤ < .   
         Therefore, we can still have result (I) and result (III) hold in a pure moral hazard 
case only if 0η = , which means people do not respond to any changes in the annuity 
quantity given by the contract. However, the optimal decision on health investment 
reveals that the solution to this case is strictly distorted compared to a full-information 
case. 
         A special case is 0=φ . To have a better understanding of the first order condition 
constraint and its role in welfare, we consider a special case of a moral hazard economy 
when the individual cares only her own consumption without taking bequests into 
account. With this assumption, we will have the following modifications of our model. 
        First, non-altruistic individuals will not leave any bequest to offspring, or 0=b . 
Second, according to Yaari (1965), the non-altruistic individuals must fully annuitize 
their savings, which means savings that earn market interest rate should be zero, or 0=s . 
The utility of non-altruistic individuals is 
              21 ln)(ln ChCU βπ+= ,                                                                                     (29) 
where hAwC −−=1 , AC )1(2 α+= . 
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hh =)(π          ),0( wh∈         
),1,0()( ∈hπ 1→π as wh → and 0→π as 0→h . Here,
w
1=′π is constant. 
          Given any contract ),( αA , consumer’s optimal health investment is decided by 
 ])1ln[()()ln( AhhAwUMaxh αβπ ++−−=  
F.O.C   )(h     ])1ln[(1 A
whAw
αβ +=−−                                                                        (30)        
         Under full information, health investment is contractible, and the competitive 
annuity firm offers a utility maximizing contract and designs a level of health investment, 











1                                                                                     (31) 





)1(ln[1                                                           (32) 
The solution of ( hA, ) is implicitly given by equation (31) and (32). 
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 Under a moral hazard economy, health investment cannot be observed, and 
competitive annuity firms offer utility maximizing contract subject to the consumer’s first 
order condition constraint and non-negative profit condition.  





++−−=      
       ..ts   1 (1 )ln
( )
r A
w A h w h
β
π
⎡ ⎤+= ⎢ ⎥− − ⎣ ⎦                                                                                (33) 
From the constraint, we know that h can be implicitly expressed by A, meaning the 
consumer chooses a privately-optimal level of health investment when given any contract. 














β             (34)                         
The first order condition w.r.t. A is 
 1 1h h A
w A h Aw A h
β ∂⎛ ⎞= − ⋅⎜ ⎟− − ∂⎝ ⎠             (35)                         
where h A
A h
∂ ⋅∂ is the elasticity of annuity purchase to health investment. The solution of 
( hA, ) is implicitly given by equation (33) and (35). 
         Table 1 shows the numerical results of consumption, annuities, health investment 
and welfare under a full-information case and under a moral hazard economy. The 















           This parameterization generates the desired properties of decisions in a full-
information case and a moral hazard case: people tend to shrink the health investment and 
annuity purchases in a moral hazard situation. We provide other parameterization results 
in appendix. Table 1(a) and 1(b) illustrate the effects of discount factor and the interest 
rate. As shown in both tables, people tend to increase both annuity purchase and health 
investment as the value of discount factor increases in a full-information case; however, 
people in a moral hazard case decrease both choices when the value of discount factor 
increases. The change of the interest rate does not have significant impact on people’s 
decisions in both cases. Admittedly, the numerical results cannot be extended to a full 
range of parameter values. In some domain of the parameter space, we may either have 
negative value of the choice variables, or no solutions. 
            The numerical results show that in a pure moral hazard case, people significantly 
reduce health care and annuity purchases, and the welfare level is lower. The reduction in 
utility in a moral hazard case is equivalent to the utility of a consumer in a full-
information case where her income is reduced by 76.9%. This reduction of total income 




5.2.3. Private-information: Adverse Selection 
We consider the case where individuals are heterogeneous according to the 
preferences ),( φβ . The population is partitioned into two distinct groups, L and H, whose 
relative sizes are fixed. Individuals in group L have low level of preference ),( LL φβ  for 
future consumption and bequests while individuals in group H have high level of 
preference ( , ),H Hβ ϕ  where 1,0 << ii φβ , HLi ,= and HL ββ < , HL φφ < . Such 
heterogeneity would be reflected in the endogenous survival rate by affecting health 
investment of people in both groups. People who have high level of health investment 
would probably have high survival rates and thus low annuity return. However, if they 
purchase contracts particularly designed for people with low survival rates (at high 
return), the annuity firms may suffer negative profits. This is an adverse selection 
problem.  
            In order to illustrate a pure adverse selection problem, we preclude the case of 
moral hazard by setting that health investment ih* ),(, LHi = is given by the “health 
investment rule” as in the full–information case, equation (22). Therefore ),(,* LHih i = is 
not a choice variable any more. Besides, we choose the range of ),( ii φβ  such that 
HL ββ < , HL φφ < and LH hh ** > .Since ih* is fixed, the survival rate )( *ihπ ),( LHi =  is 
fixed and * *( ) ( )L Hh hπ π< . In the following discussion, we use iπ , ),( LHi = to denote 
the exogenous survival rates of different types of agents. 
             Now, we introduce “the incentive constraint (IC)”. If a type H person purchases 
the annuity contract designed for a type L person, her indirect utility is given by 
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( ) ( ) * ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( , ) ln( ) ln[(1 ) (1 ) ]
ln (1 ) ln[(1 ) ]
H L L L H L L H H H L L H L H L
H H H L H H H L
U A w b s A h A r s b
b r s
α β π α
φ π φ π
′= + − − − + + + + −
′+ + − +  
where ( ) ( ) ,( , ), ( , ) arg ( , , , )
H L L L H L L L L L
s bs A b A Max U A s bα α α′′ ′∈  
Solve )()( , LHLH bs ′ : 
     
*
, ln( ) ln[(1 ) (1 ) ]
ln (1 ) ln[(1 ) ]
L H H H L L
s b
H H H H
MaxU w b s A h A r s b
b r s
β π α
ϕ π ϕ π
′ ′= + − − − + + + + − +
′ + − +  
           )(s      ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2
1 (1 ) (1 )H H H H
H L H L H L
r
C C s
π β φ π+ −− =                                                            (36) 
           )(b′       ( ) ( )
2
H H
H L H LC b
β ϕ= ′                                                                                           (37) 
Manipulating (36) and (37), we have  















+−−−−+                                          (36a) 
        ( ) ( )[ (1 ) ]
H
H L L L H L
H Hb A s
ϕ αβ ϕ′ = + ++                                                                    (37a) 
Apparently from equation (36a) and (37a), )()( , LHLH bs ′ can be expressed by ,L LA α . 
          The incentive constraint (IC) is  
                 ( )( , ) ( , )H H H H L L LU A U Aα α≥                                                                         (38) 
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The inequality (38) means that the contract designed for group L people must not be more 
attractive to members of group H than the contract designed for group H people.  
 Here we focus on a separating equilibrium where competitive firms offer indirect-
utility-maximizing non-negative profit contracts for both groups of people subject to the 
incentive constraint. It is worth-noting that cross-subsidization among contracts in any 
given firm is impossible because the firm will withdraw contracts persistently earning 
negative profits. Especially, since a contract ),( LLA α  earns non-negative profit from a 
type L agent only, if a type H agent purchases it, the firm may earn negative profit. 
Therefore the annuity firm offers an indirect-utility-maximizing contract ),( LLA α for a 
type L agent subject to the incentive constraint and non-negative profit constraint.  
             , , , ( , )i i
L L L
A i H L
Max U Aα α=  
                       s.t       ( )( , ) ( , )H H H H L L LU A U Aα α≥  
                                 1 (1 ), ,i ir i L Hπ α+ ≥ + =  
where , , ,i is b i L H′ = given by equations (16) and (17) with superscript , ,i i L H= .  
        Let q be the Lagrangian multiplier; )()( , LHLH bs ′  are given by (36) and (37); 
ih* , HLi ,=  is fixed from equation (22) with superscript , ,i i L H= .
 
Still, the inequality 
is non-binding, which can be substituted with the equality. Applying “the envelope 
theorem”, we have first order conditions for iA , HLi ,=  
              )(



















πβ                           (39) 
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q β                                                               (40)     
Equations (39) gives the optimal annuity quantity purchased by type L people while 
equation (40) gives the quantity purchased by type H people in an adverse selection 
economy.  
 
Proposition 5: In a pure adverse selection case, a competitive equilibrium is 
characterized by the decisions of *( , , , , ), ,i i i i iA s h b i L Hα ′ = , such that the altruistic 
individual i,i=L,H maximizes utility by choosing optimal savings , ,is i L H=  and 
bequests , ,ib i L H′ = , taking the optimal health investment * , ,ih i L H= , the quantity and 
return of annuities as given. If the incentive constraint is non-binding, or 0q =  , annuity 
firms offer separate indirect-utility-maximizing zero-profit contracts to members in each 
group as they would offer in a full-information case. If the incentive constraint is binding, 
or 0q ≠ , annuity firms offer the same contract to a type H person as they would offer in 
a full-information case, a different-from- full-information-case contract to a type L 
person. The solution to ,L LA s and the Lagrangian multiplier q are given by the following 





























































+−−−−+                                                        (43)                         
where )(LHs can be expressed by LA , given by (36a). 
 Equation (41) is from the incentive constraint ( )H L HU U= , where we can 
implicitly solve for LA . The RHS of (41) – HU can be easily derived from a full-
information case of group H people. Equation (43) can be used to solve for Ls ,  when the 
value of LA is given by (41). Equation (42) can be used to determine the value of q after 
LA and  Ls are solved. 
             Note that when the incentive constraint is binding, 0≠q , the Euler equation of a 
type L person, equation (39), is strictly distorted under an adverse selection problem 
































, we have a linear relation between LA  and )( LHs ,  
            
*
( ) ( )( ) 1 ( )
( ) ( )
H H H H H H H L
H L
L H H H L H H H
w b h As π β φ π β φπ π β φ π π β φ
+ + − + += −+ + + +                                   
This contradicts to equation (36a), a non-linear relation between LA  and )( LHs .   
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         We conclude that the consumption path of a type L agent is strictly distorted in a 
pure adverse selection economy because the existence of type H agents generates an 
externality. Due to the existence of type H agents, annuity firms offer a type L agent a 
contract that if a type H agent purchases it, the type H agent would gain the same utility 
as she purchases a contract particularly designed for her. The result is that a type H agent 
is offered a contract she prefers most and without any distortion compared to a first best 
case, while a type L agent is offered a contract leading to a strict distortion due to the 
imposition of incentive constraint. 
 A special case is 0== LH φφ  and 0** == LH hh . To have a better understanding 
of the adverse selection and its role in welfare, we consider a special case where the 
individuals are non-altruistic. Besides, since this is a pure adverse selection problem, we 
eliminate the effect of moral hazard by setting zero health investment. With this 
assumption, we will have the following modifications of our model. 
          First, non-altruistic individuals will not leave any bequest to the offspring, or 0=b . 
Second, according to Yaari (1965), the non-altruistic individuals must fully annuitize 
their savings, which means savings that earn market interest rate should be zero, or 0=s . 
The survival rate iπ of a type i agent ),( LHi = is exogenously given and assume 




+1 , ),( LHi = .  
         With full-information, competitive firms offer a type i agent ),( LHi = utility-
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2   ,  LHi ,=  
Since  LH ββ >  and  LH ππ > , 
 LH AA >  ,  LH CC 11 <  








π .                         (45)                         
           Under an adverse selection problem, annuity firms offer utility-maximizing 
actuarially fair contract to type L agents subject to the incentive constraint. 
              L
AA UMax HL ,  































πβπβ −=−                                                              (46) 





q πβ                                                                             (47) 
q cannot be equal to 1 according to equation (46). If the incentive constraint is binding, 
or, 0q ≠ ,from equation (46), we have 


















σ .  This means the consumption path of a type L agent is 
strictly distorted. Hence we can rule out the case where annuity firms offer a type L 
person the same contract in an adverse selection economy as they would offer in a full- 
information case. 
          From equation (48) and the definition of q , we have the following inequalities 
                    0>σ ,           0>q . 
Hence, we can settle the range of  q , 
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             HH
LL
q πβ
πβ<<0    or   1>q  
Claim  when HH
LL
q πβ
πβ<<0 , 1<σ ; when 1>q , 1>σ . 
















 and  01 >− q . Therefore,  
















 and  01 <− q .Therefore, 
















σ .     Q.E.D.                                                  
           We can establish a result here that when HH
LL
q πβ
πβ<<0 , the consumption of a 
type L agent in the first period is strictly distorted: the agent tends to increase LC1  and 
decrease LA1 ; when 1>q , consumption of a type L agent in the first period is strictly 
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distorted: the agent tends to decrease LC1  and increase 
LA1 .  To have a clear view on this 





+= 1                           (49)       
If 1<σ ,    LA in moral an adverse selection case is less than LA in a full-information case, 
and thus consumption increases. If  1>σ ,    LA in moral an adverse selection case is 




πβ<<0    or   1>q depends on the value of parameters.  
          Table 2 and 3 show a numerical model where values of Lβ are  varied to illustrate 
both case. Both tables have the same value of ,6.0=Hβ ,1000,8.0,9.0 === wLH ππ  
























           
Both tables show that the consumption plan, annuity purchases and utility of a type H 
agent is unchanged in an adverse selection economy. It can be seen that the utility of a 
type L agent is lower in an adverse selection economy. For a type L agent, when her 
discount rate is not close to that of a type H person (table 1), she tends to increase annuity 
purchases, and thus consumption falls. This is in line with our analysis when 1>q . 
When the discount rate of a type L agent is close to that of a type H agent (table 2), he 
tends to decrease annuity purchases and increase consumption in the first period, which 
gives the same result as our analysis when HH
LL
q πβ












LA  is that when a type L agents is not that impatient (table 2), she would reduce her 
annuity purchases due to a negative externality imposed by a type H agent. When a type 
L is relatively quite impatient, the annuity plan provided by the firm particularly to a type 
L agent enables her to smooth consumption. At this point, our work is different from 
Eckstein and Peled (1985) in that we have two cases to characterize the distortion of 
consumption plan of a type L agent in a simple adverse selection economy. Their work, 
by setting 1== LH ββ ,  ignores the case where consumption plan of a type L person can 
be distorted downwards. 
 
5.2.4. Private-information : Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection 
This case is a combination of the moral hazard and adverse selection. Neither health 
investment nor individual types can be observed. Individuals choose the optimal level of 
h  in response to a contract ),( αA offered by annuity firms and hide their type 
information when purchasing annuities.  
         Before we proceed to the solution, we have some new features in our model when 
both moral hazard and adverse selection problem present. These features distinguish our 
work from the previous literature. In the past, most studies mainly focus on either a pure 
moral hazard problem or a pure adverse selection problem, such as Davies and Kuhn 
(1992), Eckstein et al (1985), and Eichenbaum and Peled (1987). Studies on a pure moral 
hazard case with endogenous health investment cannot introduce heterogeneity among 
individuals within the same generation, while studies on a pure adverse selection 
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economy introduce heterogeneity by giving exogenous survival rate but fail to consider 
the role of health investment in survival rates.  
          Few studies take into account the case where both problems appear. Platoni (2008) 
considers the scenario with both types of private information. By introducing a difference 
in time preference (impatience), such heterogeneity is transformed into health investment 
and also into survival rates. He shows that individuals who are less impatient would 
invest more in health care and annuity firms considering these individuals as high-risk 
group impose the incentive constraint when offering contracts to another group (low-risk 
group). However, he fails to discuss the role of bequests in consumers’ decisions.   
             Our model considers the case where individuals are altruistic and both types of 
private information may present. We want to show that given any contract consumers 
who care more about future with ),( HH φβ  are actually those who would investment 
more on health care and thus have high survival rates. When given any annuity contract, 
the consumer’s decisions on savings, bequests and health investment are given by 
equations (16)-(18). We can simplify this system of nonlinear equations to  



























          Since the above system of nonlinear equations cannot be solved explicitly, we use 
will numerical results presented in Table 4 in Appendix. Table 4 shows that at some 
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given contracts, people with ),( HH φβ have significantly high level of health investment 
than those with ),( LL φβ . This result is consistent with those in literature. Intuitively, 
people who value future more than others would invest more in health for better chances 
of survival. However, we need to admit the strong restrictions on parameters when we 
conduct the simulation: the results are based on particularly selected parameters. In some 
domain of the parameter space, the solution is negative for some choice variables, or no 
solutions. The numerical results cannot be extended to the whole range of the parameters, 
but it provides a particular perspective that is usually expected to happen. 
 Individuals characterized by ),( HH φβ  are high-risk group for the annuity firm 
because if they purchase contracts designed for individuals with ),( LL φβ --low-risk 
group-- the firm may suffer negative profit. The incentive constraint must be imposed on 
them in the maximization problem.   
           The contract offered to individuals with ),( HH φβ when both problems present 
should be the same as offered under a pure moral hazard case, while the contract offered 
to individuals with ),( LL φβ  should be further imposed by the incentive constraint. 
Different from the pure adverse selection case, the mixed problem allows consumers to 
choose optimal health investment when given a contract ),( αA . That is, , ,ih i L H= is not 
fixed any more. We have some modifications for the utility of a type H person purchasing 
a contract that designed for a type L person. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( , ) ln( ) ( ) ln[(1 ) (1 ) ]
( ) ln (1 ( )) ln[(1 ) ]
H L L L H L L H L H H L L L H L H L
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order conditions are 
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βπ                                                  (51) 
)(h     
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
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1 ( ) ln[(1 ) (1 ) ]
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h A r s b
w b s A h
h b h r s
π β α
ϕ π ϕ π
′ ′= + + + −+ − − −
′ ′ ′+ − +
       (52) 
Equation (52) is new since in a pure moral hazard case, HLihi ,, = is fixed while in this 
case we need to relax this assumption. )()()( ,, LHLHLH hbs ′ can be expressed in terms of 
),( LLA α  in that type H individuals optimize decisions on savings, bequest and health 
investment when they choose to purchase a contract designed for type L people. 
 The incentive constraint (IC) is  
                   ( )( , ) ( , )H H H H L L LU A U Aα α≥                                                                                                 
The contract designed for group L people must not be more attractive to members of 
group H than the contract designed for group H people. 
 Competitive firms offer the indirect-utility-maximizing contract to a type L 
individuals subject to the first order constraints of , ,ih i L H= , the incentive constraint 




( , )i i L L LA i H LMax U Aα α=  
      s.t      1 ( )(1 )i ir hπ α+ ≥ +      ,  HLi ,=           
                 ( )( , ) ( , )H H H H L L LU A U Aα α≥                                 )(q  
where , , , ,i i is h b i L H′ =  given by 
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φ , HLi ,=  
The first order conditions for HLiAi ,, =  are 
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A i L H
A
πη π
∂= ⋅ =∂  is the survival elasticity due to the change in annuity 
quantity. If the constraint is nonbinding, or, 0=q , it is a pure moral hazard case for both 
types of individuals. 
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 The results show that if the incentive constraint is binding, or 0≠q , a contract 
provided to a type H agent would be the same as the firm offers under a pure adverse 
selection problem. And a type H person would choose the same optimal decisions as she 
would choose in a pure adverse selection problem.  
 However, if 0≠q , for a type L agent, his contract is characterized by the features 
from both pure moral hazard and adverse selection problem. The existence of type H 
agents put an externality on type L agents. A special case where agents do not have 
bequests motives has been investigated by Platoni (2008) and the similar results are 












When agents face uncertain lifetime, concerns about offspring lead to bequest motivation. 
The economy we describe here are full of agents valuing both intentional and accidental 
bequests. We have explored the role of intentional and accidental bequests in a 
maximum-two-period-living consumer’s optimal resource allocation decisions. We show 
that under certain circumstances individuals tend to leave the same amount of accidental 
and intentional bequests.  
         We analyze the role of information in annuity contract design. Four cases are 
discussed. In a full information case, agents leave the same amount of accidental and 
intentional bequests, and health investment is contractible so that from annuity firms’ 
view, the contract earns non-negative profit.  
           In a pure moral hazard case, we recognize a distortion in consumption due to 
private information. The annuity firms in a pure moral hazard economy would prevent 
the potential risk in negative profit and take consumer’s private information into account. 
Such preventions would lower welfare level of consumers than under a full information 
case, which can be better understood in a special case. In a pure adverse selection case, 
we see the effect of heterogeneity in individuals’ decisions and contract design. The 
existence of a high risk group (from firms’ view) imposes an externality on a low risk 
group whose consumption and other decisions are thus distorted. In the presence of both 
moral hazard and adverse selection problem, a separating equilibrium implies that both 
groups have the same characteristics as under a moral hazard case, and moreover, 
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decisions of the low risk group are further distorted due to the externality imposed by the 
high risk group.  
          We use techniques such as first order condition constraint and incentive-
compatibility constraint fully characterize solutions in each case, casting a shadow on 
future studies on annuity markets. We also provide simplified cases and numerical results 
to gain a better understanding of the problem we elaborate.  
          Finally, further research may extend the exploration in several aspects. First, an 
initial pooling equilibrium may be considered under private information, which needs to 
consider both Rothschild/Stiglitz equilibrium and Wilson equilibrium. Second, it is 
tempting to extend the model to a dynamic framework by introducing an overlapping 
generation model. However, researchers working on that would be more careful to handle 
the existence of intentional and accidental bequests. Such heterogeneity in bequests exists 
in both inter-generation and intra-generation. Third, a social security program can be 
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A  47.1204  0.8329  0.3 
h  212.0026  29.4530  0.3 
A  101.0104  0.4639  0.5 
h  454.4633  6.8111  0.5 
A  124.1062  0.01451  0.7 
h  558.3751  3.8060  0.7 
A  136.9371  0.0077  0.9 
h  616.1038  2.7633  0.9 
 





A  45.5772  1.0163  0.3 
h  201.8812  32.6085  0.3 
A  101.0188  0.5516  0.5 
h  447.4562  7.4275  0.5 
A  124.7795  0.1723  0.7 
h  552.7026  4.1464  0.7 
A  137.9799  0.0091  0.9 





A  beta  phi  h  s 
50  0.6  0.4  646.4129  298.8366 
0.3  0.2  169.6992  233.6481 
100  0.6  0.4  651.5750  259.9704 
0.3  0.2  190.3282  215.4827 
150  0.6  0.4  652.9402  225.4737 
0.3  0.2  201.4364  199.3515 
200  0.6  0.4  649.0240  196.3427 
0.3  0.2  203.9505  185.7625 
250  0.6  0.4  638.6065  173.1246 
0.3  0.2  198.6732  174.7636 
300  0.6  0.4  621.2344  155.6338 
0.3  0.2  186.4960  166.1393 
350  0.6  0.4  597.3384  143.0539 
0.3  0.2  168.3739  159.5567 
400  0.6  0.4  567.9011  134.3182 
0.3  0.2  145.2391  154.6621 
450  0.6  0.4  534.0343  128.4354 
0.3  0.2  117.9351  151.1330 
500 
0.6  0.4  496.7263  124.6244 
0.3  0.2  87.18505  148.6978 
 
Note: survival rate function is linear whh /)( =π  . The parameterization is  
0,1500 == bw 2.0,1.0, == αr . 
 
